August 26, 2007

Iraq - Exit Strategy - Washington - Military Forces - New York Times

Iraq - Exit Strategy - Washington - Military Forces - New York Times:

This is a fairly long, but insightful, piece about the changes that are needed in how U.S. Army officers think and behave. It's worth a read if you have a military background or are interested in the behaviors of our senior officer corps. When I was in the Army before and during the Viet Nam war as a junior officer, I expected ( and usually found) those senior to me to have more wartime and combat experience than I did, and looked to them for guidance.

Now the shoe seems to be on the other foot. Junior officers have more tough combat and insurgency experience from their Iraq tours than many senior officers and have begun to question their moral and political fiber. A perfect instance of that is Rumsfeld insisting, and the Bush team agreeing, over the advice of his generals to go to war with too few trained troops on the ground. Some junior officers are questioning why the generals did not stand their ground if they were convinced of the need.

The author suggests, and I agree, that the Army must change behavior in the officer corps and how promotions are decided if we are to successfully adapt to the radical Islamic terror threat. We are in a 'long war' here and I want our military to be the best it can possibly be.

I think the problem may not be as pronounced in the Special Forces/Operations elements of the Army, but" mainstream Army" may need far more versatility and substance.


"Today, President Bush maintains that the nation is in a war against terrorism — what Pentagon officials call “the long war” — in which civilization itself is at stake. Yet six years into this war, the armed forces — not just the Army, but also the Air Force, Navy and Marines — have changed almost nothing about the way their promotional systems and their entire bureaucracies operate. On the lower end of the scale, things have changed — but for the worse. West Point cadets are obligated to stay in the Army for five years after graduating. In a typical year, about a quarter to a third of them decide not to sign on for another term. In 2003, when the class of 1998 faced that decision, only 18 percent quit the force: memories of 9/11 were still vivid; the war in Afghanistan seemed a success; and war in Iraq was under way. Duty called, and it seemed a good time to be an Army officer. But last year, when the 905 officers from the class of 2001 had to make their choice to stay or leave, 44 percent quit the Army. It was the service’s highest loss rate in three decades."

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